Article 1

The People of the State of Michigan enact:

Article 1 – GENERAL PROVISIONS

• MCL 722.1101 Short title.
• MCL 722.1102 Definitions.
• MCL 722.1103 Scope of act; limitation.
• MCL 722.1104 Proceeding pertaining to Indian child.
• MCL 722.1105 Child-custody law or determination of foreign country.
• MCL 722.1106 Child-custody determination of this state.
• MCL 722.1107 Jurisdiction; question; priority.
• MCL 722.1108 Notice; manner; proof of service; notice not required.
• MCL 722.1109 Personal jurisdiction.
• MCL 722.1110 Communication between states; participation of parties; “record” defined.
• MCL 722.1111 Testimony.
• MCL 722.1112 Request to out-of-state court; expenses; preserving and forwarding records.

MCL 722.1101 Short title.

Sec. 101.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the “uniform child-custody jurisdiction and enforcement act”.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 101

Section 1 of the UCCJA was a statement of the purposes of the Act.  Although extensively cited by courts, it was eliminated because Uniform Acts no longer contain such a section. Nonetheless, this Act should be interpreted according to its purposes which are to:

(1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other States in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from State to State with harmful effects on their well-being;

(2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other States to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that State which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;

(3) Discourage the use of the interstate system for continuing controversies over child custody;

(4) Deter abductions of children;

(5) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other States in this State;

(6) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other States;

MCL 722.1102 Definitions.

Sec. 102.

As used in this act:

(a) “Abandoned” means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.

(b) “Child” means an individual who is younger than 18 years of age.

(c) “Child-custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other court order providing for legal custody, physical custody, or parenting time with respect to a child. Child-custody determination includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. Child-custody determination does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.

(d) “Child-custody proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or parenting time with respect to a child is an issue. Child-custody proceeding includes a proceeding for divorce, separate maintenance, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. Child-custody proceeding does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under article 3.

(e) “Commencement” means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.

(f) “Court” means an entity authorized under the law of a state to establish, enforce, or modify a child-custody determination.

(g) “Home state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than 6 months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with a parent or person acting as a parent. A period of temporary absence of a parent or person acting as a parent is included as part of the period.

(h) “Initial determination” means the first child-custody determination concerning a particular child.

(i) “Issuing court” means the court that makes a child-custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this act.

(j) “Issuing state” means the state in which a child-custody determination is made.

(k) “Modification” means a child-custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous child-custody determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous child-custody determination.

(l) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, or government; governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; public corporation; or any other legal or commercial entity.

(m) “Person acting as a parent” means a person, other than a parent, who meets both of the following criteria:

(i) Has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of 6 consecutive months, including a temporary absence, within 1 year immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding.

(ii) Has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of this state.

(n) “Physical custody” means the physical care and supervision of a child.

(o) “Register” means to comply with the procedures of section 304 to make a child-custody determination enforceable in this state.

(p) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or a territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(q) “Tribe” means an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, that is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.

(r) “Warrant” means a court order authorizing a law enforcement officer to take physical custody of a child.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 102

The UCCJA did not contain a definition of “child.” The definition here is taken from the PKPA.

The definition of “child-custody determination” now closely tracks the PKPA definition. It encompasses any judgment, decree or other order which provides for the custody of, or visitation with, a child, regardless of local terminology, including such labels as “managing conservatorship” or “parenting plan.”

The definition of “child-custody proceeding” has been expanded from the comparable definition in the UCCJA. These listed proceedings have generally been determined to be the type of proceeding to which the UCCJA and PKPA are applicable. The list of examples removes any controversy about the types of proceedings where a custody determination can occur. Proceedings that affect access to the child are subject to this Act. The inclusion of proceedings related to protection from domestic violence is necessary because in some States domestic violence proceedings may affect custody of and visitation with a child. Juvenile delinquency or proceedings to confer contractual rights are not “custody proceedings” because they do not relate to civil aspects of access to a child. While a determination of paternity is covered under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the custody and visitation aspects of paternity cases are custody proceedings.  Cases involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction have not been included at this point because custody of the child is not determined in a proceeding under the International Child Abductions Remedies Act. Those proceedings are specially included in the Article 3 enforcement process.

“Commencement” has been included in the definitions as a replacement for the term “pending” found in the UCCJA. Its inclusion simplifies some of the simultaneous proceedings provisions of this Act.

The definition of “home State” has been reworded slightly. No substantive change is intended from the UCCJA.

The term “issuing State” is borrowed from UIFSA. In UIFSA, it refers to the court that issued the support or parentage order. Here, it refers to the State, or the court, which made the custody determination that is sought to be enforced. It is used primarily in Article 3.

The term “person” has been added to ensure that the provisions of this Act apply when the State is the moving party in a custody proceeding or has legal custody of a child. The definition of “person” is the one that is mandated for all Uniform Acts.

The term “person acting as a parent” has been slightly redefined. It has been broadened from the definition in the UCCJA to include a person who has acted as a parent for a significant period of time prior to the filing of the custody proceeding as well as a person who currently has physical custody of the child. In addition, a person acting as a parent must either have legal custody or claim a right to legal custody under the law of this State. The reference to the law of this State means that a court determines the issue of whether someone is a “person acting as a parent” under its own law. This reaffirms the traditional view that a court in a child custody case applies its own substantive law. The court does not have to undertake a choice-of-law analysis to determine whether the individual who is claiming to be a person acting as a parent has standing to seek custody of the child.

The definition of “tribe” is the one mandated for use in Uniform Acts. Should a State choose to apply this Act to tribal adjudications, this definition should be enacted as well as the entirety of Section 104.

The term “contestant” as has been omitted from this revision. It was defined in the UCCJA § 2(1) as “a person, including a parent, who claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect to a child.” It seems to have served little purpose over the years, and whatever function it once had has been subsumed by state laws on who has standing to seek custody of or visitation with a child. In addition UCCJA § 2(5) of the which defined “decree” and “custody decree” has been eliminated as duplicative of the definition of “custody determination.”

MCL 722.1103 Scope of act; limitation.

Sec. 103.

This act does not govern an adoption proceeding or a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical care for a child.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 103

Two proceedings are governed by other acts. Adoption cases are excluded from this Act because adoption is a specialized area which is thoroughly covered by the Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) (1994). Most States either will adopt that Act or will adopt the jurisdictional provisions of that Act. Therefore the jurisdictional provisions governing adoption proceeding are generally found elsewhere.

However, there are likely to be a number of instances where it will be necessary to apply this Act in an adoption proceeding. For example, if a State adopts the UAA then Section 3-101 of the Act specifically refers in places to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act which will become a reference to this Act. Second, the UAA requires that if an adoption is denied or set aside, the court is to determine the child’s custody. UAA § 3-704. Those custody proceedings would be subject to this Act. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter’s Ruminations, 30 Fam.L.Q. 345 (1996).

Children that are the subject of interstate placements for adoption or foster care are governed by the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). The UAA § 2-107 provides that the provisions of the compact, although not jurisdictional, supply the governing rules for all children who are subject to it. As stated in the Comments to that section: “Once a court exercises jurisdiction, the ICPC helps determine the legality of an interstate placement.” For a discussion of the relationship between the UCCJA and the ICPC see J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).

Proceedings pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical care for children are outside the scope of this Act since they are not custody determinations. All States have procedures which allow the State to temporarily supersede parental authority for purposes of emergency medical procedures. Those provisions will govern without regard to this Act.

MCL 722.1104 Proceeding pertaining to Indian child.

Sec. 104.

(1) A child-custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in the Indian child welfare act of 1978, Public Law 95-608, 25 U.S.C. 1901 to 1903, 1911 to 1923, 1931 to 1934, 1951 to 1952, and 1961 to 1963, is not subject to this act to the extent that the proceeding is governed by the Indian child welfare act of 1978, Public Law 95-608, 25 U.S.C. 1901 to 1903, 1911 to 1923, 1931 to 1934, 1951 to 1952, and 1961 to 1963.

(2) A court of this state shall treat a tribe as a state of the United States for the purposes of articles 1 and 2.

(3) A child-custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this act must be recognized and enforced under article 3.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 104

This section allows States the discretion to extend the terms of this Act to Indian tribes by removing the brackets. The definition of “tribe” is found at Section 102(q). This Act does not purport to legislate custody jurisdiction for tribal courts. However, a Tribe could adopt this Act as enabling legislation by simply replacing references to “this State” with “this Tribe.”

Subsection (a) is not bracketed. If the Indian Child Welfare Act requires that a case be heard in tribal court, then its provisions determine jurisdiction.

MCL 722.1105 Child-custody law or determination of foreign country.

Sec. 105.

(1) A court of this state shall treat a foreign country as a state of the United States for the purposes of applying articles 1 and 2.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), a child-custody determination made in a foreign country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this act must be recognized and enforced under article 3.

(3) A court of this state need not apply this act if the child-custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec 105

The provisions of this Act have international application to child custody proceedings and determinations of other countries. Another country will be treated as if it were a State of the United States for purposes of applying Articles 1 and 2 of this Act. Custody determinations of other countries will be enforced if the facts of the case indicate that jurisdiction was in substantial compliance with the requirements of this Act.

In this section, the term “child-custody determination” should be interpreted to include proceedings relating to custody or analogous institutions of the other country. See generally, Article 3 of The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. 35 I.L.M. 1391 (1996).

A court of this State may refuse to apply this Act when the child custody law of the other country violates basic principles relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The same concept is found in of the Section 20 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (return of the child may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms). In applying subsection (3), the court’s scrutiny should be on the child custody law of the foreign country and not on other aspects of the other legal system. This Act takes no position on what laws relating to child custody would violate fundamental freedoms. While the provision is a traditional one in international agreements, it is invoked only in the most egregious cases.

This section is derived from Section 23 of the UCCJA.

MCL 722.1106 Child-custody determination of this state.

Sec. 106.

A child-custody determination made by a court of this state that had jurisdiction under this act binds all persons who have been served in accordance with the laws of this state or notified in accordance with section 108 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to those persons, the child-custody determination is conclusive as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the child-custody determination is modified.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 106

No substantive changes have been made to this section which was Section 12 of the UCCJA.

MCL 722.1107 Jurisdiction; question; priority.

Sec. 107.

If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this act is raised in a child-custody proceeding, upon request of a party, the question must be given priority on the court calendar and handled expeditiously.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 107

No substantive change was made to this section which was Section 24 of the UCCJA. The section is placed toward the beginning of Article 1 to emphasize its importance.

The language change from “case” to “question” is intended to clarify that it is the jurisdictional issue which must be expedited and not the entire custody case. Whether the entire custody case should be given priority is a matter of local law.

MCL 722.1108 Notice; manner; proof of service; notice not required.

Sec. 108.

(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction when a person is outside this state may be given in a manner prescribed by the law of this state for service of process or by the law of the state in which the service is made. Notice must be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, but may be by publication if other means are not effective.

(2) Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this state or by the law of the state in which the service is made.

(3) Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 108

This section authorizes notice and proof of service to be made by any method allowed by either the State which issues the notice or the State where the notice is received. This eliminates the need to specify the type of notice in the Act and therefore the provisions of Section 5 of the UCCJA which specified how notice was to be accomplished were eliminated. The change reflects an approach in this Act to use local law to determine many procedural issues. Thus, service by facsimile is permissible if allowed by local rule in either State. In addition, where special service or notice rules are available for some procedures, in either jurisdiction, they could be utilized under this Act. For example, if a case involves domestic violence and the statute of either State would authorize notice to be served by a peace officer, such service could be used under this Act.

Although Section 105 requires foreign countries to be treated as States for purposes of this Act, attorneys should be cautioned about service and notice in foreign countries. Countries have their own rules on service which must usually be followed. Attorneys should consult the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 20 U.S.T. 36, T.I.A.S. 6638 (1965).

MCL 722.1109 Personal jurisdiction.

Sec. 109.

(1) A party to a child-custody proceeding who is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state and is a responding party under article 2, a party in a proceeding to modify a child-custody determination under article 2, or a petitioner in a proceeding to enforce or register a child-custody determination under article 3 may appear and participate in the proceeding without submitting to personal jurisdiction over the party for another proceeding or purpose.

(2) A party is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state solely by being physically present for the purpose of participating in a proceeding under this act. If a party is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis other than physical presence, the party may be served with process in this state. If a party present in this state is subject to the jurisdiction of another state, service of process allowable under the law of that state may be accomplished in this state.

(3) The immunity granted by subsection (1) does not extend to civil litigation based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this act committed by an individual while present in this state.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 109

This section establishes a general principle that participation in a custody proceeding does not, by itself, give the court jurisdiction over any issue for which personal jurisdiction over the individual is required. The term “participate” should be read broadly. For example, if jurisdiction is proper under Article 2, a respondent in an original custody determination, or a party in a modification determination, should be able to request custody without this constituting the seeking of affirmative relief that would waive personal jurisdictional objections. Once jurisdiction is proper under Article 2, a party should not be placed in the dilemma of choosing between seeking custody or protecting a right not to be subject to a monetary judgment by a court with no other relationship to the party.

This section is comparable to the immunity provision of UIFSA § 314. A party who is otherwise not subject to personal jurisdiction can appear in a custody proceeding or an enforcement action without being subject to the general jurisdiction of the State by virtue of the appearance. However, if the petitioner would otherwise be subject to the jurisdiction of the State, appearing in a custody proceeding or filing an enforcement proceeding will not provide immunity. Thus, if the non-custodial parent moves from the State that decided the custody determination, that parent is still subject to the state’s jurisdiction for enforcement of child support if the child or an individual obligee continues to reside there. See UIFSA § 205. If the non-custodial parent returns to enforce the visitation aspects of the custody determination, the State can utilize any appropriate means to collect the back-due child support. However, the situation is different if both parties move from State A after the determination, with the custodial parent and the child establishing a new home State in State B, and the non-custodial parent moving to State C. The non-custodial parent is not, at this point, subject to the jurisdiction of State B for monetary matters. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). If the non-custodial parent comes into State B to enforce the visitation aspects of the determination, the non-custodial parent is not subject to the jurisdiction of State B for those proceedings and issues requiring personal jurisdiction by filing the enforcement action.

A party also is immune from service of process during the time in the State for an enforcement action except for those claims for which jurisdiction could be based on contacts other than mere physical presence. Thus, when the non-custodial parent comes into State B to enforce the visitation aspects of the decree, State B cannot acquire jurisdiction over the child support aspects of the decree by serving the non-custodial parent in the State. Cf. UIFSA § 611 (personally serving the obligor in the State of the residence of the obligee is not by itself a sufficient jurisdictional basis to authorize a modification of child support). However, a party who is in this State and subject to the jurisdiction of another State may be served with process to appear in that State, if allowable under the laws of that State.

As the Comments to UIFSA § 314 note, the immunity provided by this section is limited. It does not provide immunity for civil litigation unrelated to the enforcement action. For example, a party to an enforcement action is not immune from service regarding a claim that involves an automobile accident occurring while the party is in the State.

MCL 722.1110 Communication between states; participation of parties; “record” defined.

Sec. 110.

(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under this act.

(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.

(3) A communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be made of that communication.

(4) Except as provided in subsection (3), a record must be made of a communication under this section. The parties must be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to the record.

(5) For the purposes of this section, “record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. Record includes each of the following:

(a) Notes or transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the courts.

(b) An electronic recording of a telephone call.

(c) A memorandum or electronic record of a communication between the courts.

(d) A memorandum or electronic record of a communication between the courts that a court makes after the communication.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 110

This section emphasizes the role of judicial communications. It authorizes a court to communicate concerning any proceeding arising under this Act. This includes communication with foreign tribunals and tribal courts. Communication can occur in many different ways such as by telephonic conference and by on-line or other electronic communication. The Act does not preclude any method of communication and recognizes that there will be increasing use of modern communication techniques.

Communication between courts is required under Sections 204, 206, and 306 and strongly suggested in applying Section 207. Apart from those sections, there may be less need under this Act for courts to communicate concerning jurisdiction due to the prioritization of home state jurisdiction. Communication is authorized, however, whenever the court finds it would be helpful. The court may authorize the parties to participate in the communication. However, the Act does not mandate participation. Communication between courts is often difficult to schedule and participation by the parties may be impractical. Phone calls often have to be made after-hours or whenever the schedules of judges allow.

This section does require that a record be made of the conversation and that the parties have access to that record in order to be informed of the content of the conversation. The only exception to this requirement is when the communication involves relatively inconsequential matters such as scheduling, calendars, and court records. Included within this latter type of communication would be matters of cooperation between courts under Section 112. A record includes notes or transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum or an electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum or an electronic record made by a court after the communication.

The second sentence of subsection (2) protects the parties against unauthorized ex parte communications. The parties’ participation in the communication may amount to a hearing if there is an opportunity to present facts and jurisdictional arguments. However, absent such an opportunity, the participation of the parties should not to be considered a substitute for a hearing and the parties must be given an opportunity to fairly and fully present facts and arguments on the jurisdictional issue before a determination is made. This may be done through a hearing or, if appropriate, by affidavit or memorandum. The court is expected to set forth the basis for its jurisdictional decision, including any court-to-court communication which may have been a factor in the decision.

MCL 722.1111 Testimony.

Sec. 111.

(1) In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child-custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon which the testimony is taken.

(2) A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an appropriate location for a deposition or testimony.

(3) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 111

No substantive changes have been made to subsection (1) which was Section 18 of the UCCJA.

Subsections (2) and (3) merely provide that modern modes of communication are permissible in the taking of testimony and the transmittal of documents. See UIFSA § 316.

MCL 722.1112 Request to out-of-state court; expenses; preserving and forwarding records.

Sec. 112.

(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to do any of the following:

(a) Hold an evidentiary hearing.

(b) Order a person to produce or give evidence under procedures of that state.

(c) Order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a child involved in a pending proceeding.

(d) Forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and an evaluation prepared in compliance with the request.

(e) Order a party to a child-custody proceeding or a person having physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without the child.

(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may hold a hearing or enter an order described in subsection (1).

(3) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under subsection (1) or (2) may be assessed against the parties according to the law of this state.

(4) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child-custody proceeding until the child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall forward a certified copy of these records.

History: 2001, Act 195, Eff. Apr. 1, 2002

Official Comment on Sec. 112

This section is the heart of judicial cooperation provision of this Act. It provides mechanisms for courts to cooperate with each other in order to decide cases in an efficient manner without causing undue expense to the parties. Courts may request assistance from courts of other States and may assist courts of other States.

The provision on the assessment of costs for travel provided in the UCCJA § 19 has been changed. The UCCJA provided that the costs may be assessed against the parties or the State or county. Assessment of costs against a government entity in a case where the government is not involved is inappropriate and therefore that provision has been removed. In addition, if the State is involved as a party, assessment of costs and expenses against the State must be authorized by other law.

It should be noted that the term “expenses” means out-of-pocket costs. Overhead costs should not be assessed as expenses.

No other substantive changes have been made. The term “social study” as used in the UCCJA was replaced with the modern term: “custody evaluation.” The Act does not take a position on the admissibility of a custody evaluation that was conducted in another State. It merely authorizes a court to seek assistance of, or render assistance to, a court of another State.

This section combines the text of Sections 19-22 of the UCCJA.